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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality.—The essence of the experimental method is to bring to view “the exact conditions and the only conditions” of a phenomenon. The question of the laboratory is: “What facts must be present in order that another fact may show itself?”

The value of the conception of causation is historical. There is a difference between results of experiment and facts of history, but it is a difference of interest, not of existence. Julius Cæsar has a unique interest not appertaining to the ounce of water in the test-tube after an experiment that explains the origin of water by forming some. In existence that water is as unique a fact as Cæsar, but other water might be substituted for it without loss. Hence scientific treatment assumes a generalized form, and historic an individualized. Yet every scientific statement is enunciated of an individual, and is hypothetically generalized to apply to the class.

There is exact identity between what the experimental method does for our physical knowledge and what the historical method in a narrower sense may do in the spiritual region. We cannot apply artificial isolation and recombination to the facts of ethical science. Such facts can be unraveled only through history, through a consideration of how they came to be what they are. Primitive periods, in their relative simplicity, supply a substitute for artificial isolation. Following the phenomenon into the more complicated and refined form which it assumes later is a substitute for experimental synthesis.

It is absurd to feel that the earliest stages fix the value of the entire series, and on that ground to object to genetic study of ethics. This fallacy is deeply entrenched. It is due to an old, erroneous, metaphysical conception of causation, as if the cause somehow contained the effect. That which has always and everywhere been required is far from being a law for the present.

Historical study of ethics does not aim at discovery of mere points of agreement between ethical codes. The idea of comparative science seeking for similarities of structure has been left far behind in all departments but that of consciousness, which deals with myths, rites, institutions, and moral practices. Knowledge of differences is as important as knowledge of resemblances. What we want to know is the *process* which at different phases includes all the resemblances, all the differences, all the simplicity, all the complexity. Such knowledge would not be bare and useless facts, but the means of understanding and determining *future* experiences.—PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY, *Philosophical Review*, March, 1902. E. C. H.

Methods Applicable to the Study of Social Facts.—In discussing the possibility of using certain methods in study of social facts there may be implied an important doctrine of Stuart Mill, which he himself did not consistently bear in mind. He says: “I can but wonder at the importance that is attached to the character of inconceivability when we know by so many examples that our capacity or incapacity to conceive a thing has so little to do with the possibility of the knowledge itself, and is a purely accidental circumstance dependent on our habit of mind. The progress of science consists precisely in eliminating these sham impossibilities. All negative arguments are liable to reversal by subsequent discovery.”

Scientific method consists in discovering how most readily to arrive at general notions and at laws of the sequence of phenomena. The former must precede. Confused definitions must be escaped. Any common quality may be the basis of a classification, but science must found her definitions on the qualities that connote the essential nature. Superficial appearances and current prejudices suggest less fundamental bases for classification and definition. Loose definition is accompanied by nomenclature inadequate to scientific uses.

Greater difficulties are encountered in the search for social laws. It has been said by Mill that the method of difference is inapplicable because two nations (societies) identical save in the one particular to be investigated can never be found. But it is possible to compare the same nation with itself before and after the arrival of an element of change, *e. g.*, a new commercial treaty. The difficulty is not in finding comparable cases, but in discovering laws applicable to other facts than those by which the laws have been established.

The prime need is to *push social analysis as far as possible, e. g.*, not to try to account for "prosperity" in the lump. This rule is the answer to the other difficulties raised by Stuart Mill, all of which are summed up in the impossibility of ascending from effects to causes by induction, unaided by deduction, when the effects are due to a complex of numerous heterogeneous elements. The difficulties arise from the substitution of alternative causes, union of auxiliary causes, or conflict of opposing causes, to which may be added the distance in space and time between causes and effects.

Induction is not useless whenever it requires the support of deduction. On the contrary, even in physics and chemistry the triumphs of induction are won by the aid of deduction.

Analysis, pushed to the very elements of society, is the essential preparation for discovery of social laws. And the fundamental principles of analysis are these: (1) Society must be divided into its different classes. (2) The characteristic tendencies of each class, its habits and its traditions, must be recognized. (3) The different influences capable of modifying these tendencies, influences that arise from the actions of other classes — as government, religious powers, rival classes, the hostile, superior or subordinate; those that arise from things — natural environments, and the accumulations due to human technique and labor. (4) To these must be added the influences that arise from other peoples.

It is reasonable to expect deductions in the social sciences like those possible in the physical sciences. As from known laws we can explain the elevation of the temperature of the body above that of the surrounding atmosphere or the reflections from spherical mirrors, so also may we expect to explain such phenomena as the strikes of laborers.

Social classes are the proper matter for social science.—ARTHUR BAUER, *Revue philosophique*, March, 1902. E. C. H.

The Organization of Small Industries under Modern Conditions.—The kind of organization here referred to was discussed at the international congresses "de la petite bourgeoisie," held in Belgium in 1899 and 1901. Its successes have been achieved mostly in the Germanic countries.

The competition of small with capitalistic industries is an affair of technique and commercial organization as well as of capital. There are some of the advantages of doing things on a big scale of which small industries may possess themselves. The German successes referred to have been won by corporations of co-operating tradesmen, in "credit societies" to procure capital, societies for purchase of raw materials, selling societies, and societies for purchase of improved tools and machines. These are distinct from ordinary "co-operative" societies, since the members carry on their separate shops.

The advantages of buying and selling wholesale, and not in dribblets through costly middle-men, are plain. The credit societies are the heart of the whole system and are the most numerous of all; indeed, they alone can be spoken of as numerous; but societies of the other kinds are slowly increasing in number. In 1898 there were seventy raw-material societies and sixty selling unions; in 1900, eighty-two of the former and sixty-seven of the latter.

Owing to the experimental stage of such undertakings, and to different conditions in different trades and different localities, they vary widely in aims and methods. Those which have achieved notable success have all been in centers of considerable population. Slight subsidies to aid in the first founding of such organizations, and appointment of instructors in business methods suitable to various trades, and an active propaganda, are suggested as means of promoting the movement. Government bureaus have a part to play here.

Among the tradesmen who have been benefited by the plan are carpenters, cabinet-makers, tailors — who compete with the great "ready-made" establishments — bakers, and butchers — who sell their subsidiary products, as hides and tallow, at a great advantage. An obstacle is the intense spirit of competition among tradesmen, who should find an example in the brilliant successes of co-operation among farmers. That which has been accomplished is only an interesting beginning of what is possible. However, extravagant expectations are to be deprecated. In many departments the small shop need not disappear before the giant factory.—VICTOR BRANTS, *La réforme sociale*, March, 1902. E. C. H.

The International Forces of Socialism.—*La revue socialiste* for February, quoting with comments an article published in Canada, gives the following statement of votes cast by Socialists in successive elections in various countries:

In Austria, in 1895, 90,000 votes; 1897, 750,000; 1900, 1,000,000.

France, 1885, 30,000; 1888, 91,000; 1893, 590,000; 1898, 1,000,000.

Denmark, 1872, 315; 1884, 6,805; 1887, 8,408; 1890, 17,232; 1892, 20,098; 1895, 25,019; 1898, 32,000.

Great Britain, 1895, 55,000; 1900, 100,000.

Italy, 1893, 20,000; 1895, 76,400; 1897, 134,946.

United States, 1890, 13,704; 1892, 21,562; 1896, 36,275; 1900, 140,000.

Servia, 1895, 50,000.

Spain, 1893, 7,000; 1895, 14,800; 1897, 28,000.

Switzerland, 1890, 13,500; 1898, 29,822; 1896, 36,468.

Belgium, 1894, 334,500; 1898, 534,324.

Germany, 1867, 30,000; 1871, 101,927; 1874, 351,670; 1877, 486,843; 1878, 437,158; 1881, 311,961; 1884, 599,990; 1887, 763,128; 1890, 1,427,298; 1893, 1,786,738; 1898, 2,125,000.

The editor believes that the number of Socialist men who live in other countries or are prevented by political conditions or economic pressure from voting with the party would swell the grand total to 8,000,000. E. C. H.